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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT BRIDGES and DELEEN
BRIDGES, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,

Case No.
12359

Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Defendant and Respondent

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts as sufficient the STATE:MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE, the
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT and the RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL as set forth in appellants' brief.
Italics and emphasis ours unless otherwise indicated.
1

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Appellants have not seen fit to provide the court
with a full transcript of the testimony nor any of the
evidence introduced upon the trial of the case by specific
testimony of witnesses and for that reason respondent
will make a separate statement of facts and refer to such
record as is available in support thereof.
In the original complaint and in all papers filed up
to the time of trial the deceased was named as "Almon
Joseph Bridges." Now in appellants' brief he is named
as "Joseph Almon Bridges." Respondent will assume
the original complaint to be correct.
The accident in which Almon Joseph Bridges met
his death occurred at approximately 11 :45 p.m. on October 26, 1968, at a point where a single Union Pacific
Railroad track crosses a public highway west of Orem in
Utah County. This roadway was originally designated
in the complaint ( R. 3) as 20th South Street in Orem,
Utah. It extends from 20th South in Orem westerly
towards the shores of Utah Lake, but it was found that
at the point of the accident the roadway is some distance
outside of the City limits of Orem City, and therefore at
various points during the trial it was designated not only
as 20th South Street in Orem but more often as 1600
North Street in Utah County, a Utah County highway
(R. 45).
On the date and at the time of night stated, a Union
Pacific Railroad train consisting of two switch engine
units and thirty gondola or hopper type cars ( R. 13)
2

was traveling in a southerly direction at a speed of approximately 18 miles per hour (R. 14), at which time
the deceased, Almon Joseph Bridges, drove his automobile into collision with the seventeenth car back of the
engine ( R. 14). The collision occurred after the automobile had laid down approximately 165 feet of skid
marks and was still of sufficient force to cause the damage to the automobile as shown in defendants Exhibit
46 and in the pictures as taken by the highway patrol as
introduced in evidence at the trial as Exhibits 2, 3, 4
and 5. Exhibits 24 and 19, as also 23, as introduced by
plaintiffs give a fair representation of the crossing as
shown from an aerial view. Exhibit 33 shows a panoramic view of the crossing and the railroad track, together
with the highway approach, taken from the roadway at
a point approximately 160 feet east of the crossing. Exhibit 1 is an engineer's map made from an actual survey
and drawn to scale showing the railroad track and the
highways in the vicinity and all fixed objects existing at
the time.
There was no flasher or automatic signaling device
at the crossing and there was one single crossbuck on the
west side of the railroad tracks, which crossbuck had
been constructed and placed there new in July of 1968
( R. 15) and was a reflectorized type cross buck. The deceased, although he approached the crossing from the
east, was well acquainted with the crossing and the entire area. He had been raised in the vicinity and had
liYed his entire life at a point approximately three blocks
north and three blocks east of the crossing ( R. 27) and
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for some time up to within a week or two of the accident
had worked-his last job while he
the Clegg
Construction Company ( R. 29, 30) located on this 20th
South Street, shown on Exhibit 2-!, beiug the long building nearest where said 20th South roadway underpasses
the interstate freeway as shown in Exhibit 2-!.
During the period of some few years prior to the
accident, Interstate Highway X o. 15 was being constructed through the area, and in connection with such
construction a roadway which had been designated as
1350 North in C tah County was blocked off and made
into a dead end roadway as it came against the west side
of the freeway. This is shown in the extreme upper portion of Exhibit 24 referred to by appellants. Prior to the
freeway construction there had been automatic flashing
light signals at the intersection of both C nion Pacific
and Denver & Rio Grande tracks where this 1350 North
Street crossed such tracks in an east-west direction.
\Vith the blocking of 1350 North and making it a dead
end street there was no more public travel upon 1350
North. The flashers at the two railroad intersections on
1350 North no longer served any purpose, and on July
23, 1963, on behalf of Utah County, the County Surveyor, La Vern D. Green, filed an application with the Public Service Commission of Utah setting forth the facts
with respect to the ''dead ending" of Utah County Roadway 1350 North, and requested that the flasher signal
on the Union Pacific tracks be moved to 1600 North
where it would serve a more useful purpose for the public. The application in which Utah County was the ap-
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plicant v.·as handled on an ex parte basis and in it lJtah
County requested permission not only to move the signal but for authority to widen, replank and resurface
the crossing. There was no statement, suggestion or even
hint of any kind, in such application as filed, that 1600
X orth Street was in any way an extra hazardous crossing, but permission was merely asked on behalf of L"tah
County to make the improvements. The matter was
<locketed as Utah PSC X o. 5317. An investigator was
sent by the Public Service Commission to go to Utah
County, contact the Ctah County officials and make
such investigation as was thought necessary. An engineer for Cnion Pacific joined in this investigation. Both
of these "investigators" died prior to the time of the accident in question. If there was any written report of the
investigation made by the Public Service Commission
representative, none has ever been indicated; but after
the investigation an ex parte report and order was issued
by the PSClJ dated February 14, 1964, which specifically stated that it was issued "upon the application of
etah County for permission to widen and improve two
e,risting railroad crossings over the Union Pacific Railroad ... to remove the e.risting automatic electric railroad crossing -u:arning signals at Utah County Road
UC-1350 West Street, railroad mile post 755.83 of said
railroad ... and to install automatic electric railroad
crossing warning signals at said UC-1600 North Street."
The Commission's report and order indicates that no notice, public or otherwise, was given and no hearing was
held for the purpose of producing evidence or taking
5

testimony, but the Commission stated that the matter
was one which "might be investigated and determined
without formal hearing," and after "having investigated
the facts and circumstances" not with respect to any
hazards at the crossing but with respect to the "facts and
circumstances pertinent to the application," the Commission, under date of February 14, 1964, among others,
made the following findings:
"3. Applicant proposes (also) to remove the auto-

matic electric crossing signals presently existing at
County Road U.C. 1350 North Street ... which now
dead ends against the Interstate Highway 15 .... "
"2. Applicant has widened the surfacing of ...
County Road 1600 North Street ... and to further improve said crossing at U.C. 1600 North Street ... appli-

cant proposes to install, operate and maintain automatic
electric crossing protection signals for the protection of
the public."
The Commission then finds:
"4 .... it appears to the Commission that the pro-

posal of applicant is in the public interest."
The Commission then goes on to detail certain arrangements to be made by Utah County as "are necessary or required for the proposed construction, operation
and maintenance of the said crossing."
There was no mention or even any hint of evidence
developed and no finding of any kind as to any conditions-hazardous, extra hazardous, or otherwise-which
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might exist at the crossing or at either of the two crossings mentioned.
Following the findings, the Commission concluded
that "public convenience and necessity requires that the
prayer of the applicant should be granted." The accompanying order merely provided "that the proposals of
Utah County contained in the application herein at the
County's expense be and the same are hereby approved
in accordance with the findings herein . ... "
THE FOREGOING FACTS 'VITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE CO.MMISSION'S ORDER DO
NOT APPEAR IN THE RECORD AS _FURNISHED TO THIS COURT BY APPELLANTS, ALTHOUGH APPELLANTS HAVE
SEEN FIT TO REFER TO SOl\IE OF SUCH
FACTS AND ON PAGE 12 OF THEIR BRIEF
PURPORT TO QUOTE THE ORDERING PROVISION OF SUCH ORDER.
Counsel for respondent informed appellants' counsel that such application and order were not in the record
and that unless they were properly in the record, could
not properly be considered by this Honorable Court and
suggested that appellants' counsel make some attempt to
furnish such application and order for the court's consideration. As of the time of writing this brief counsel
for appellants has not seen fit to do so.
Information with respect to the application to the
Public Service Commission of Utah, and the order as
7

referred to, was discussed prior to the time of pre-trial.
Counsel for respondent was advised that appellants'
counsel intended to offer them in evidence; whereupon,
respondent's counsel filed the Motion in Limine as appears at pages 58 and 59 of the record herein. The trial
court heard arguments on the .Motion in Limine prior to
tht time of selecting the jury on the morning of trial,
July 27, 1970, between the hours of 9 :00 and 10 :00 a.m.
(R. 192, Pages l to 7, Inclusive). Counsel for respondent had made objections in full with respect to the matter
prior to the morning of July 27 and such matters were
reported in full in the pre-trial order, hearing on which
was had on July 2, 1970, (R. 45, particularly Paragraph
4, Page 2 of such pretrial order).
The matter had been submitted to the trial court
fully by brief prior to the time of the trial in line with
the stipulated procedure, particularly Paragraph C 2,
Page 3, (R. 46).
The trial court granted the
in Limine as
presented on behalf of defendant and respondent.
The trial court held that if the PSCU order provided anything it would be nothing more than a conclusion without any evidentiary facts or findings as to the
crossing or its conditions; that the conclusion was one
which the jury was to draw from evidence which would
have to be introduced to show actual conditions existing
at the crossing.
The trial court held that he would not allow in evidence from any witness the mere statement of a conclu8

sion that such witness thought the crossing was hazardous, and heid that such would usurp the function of the
jury and that he did not think he should allow any witness to usurp the function of the jury. The court went
on to state (R. 192, Page 5) : "However, I have no objection to him telling the elements, if he says this, that
that crossing has a lot of traffic on it, or if he says that
because of any curvature in it it is hazardous or because
of something. Now from observation, from his own observation." Again on Page 6 (R. 192), " ... I think you
understand. I want to give you every leeway, but I don't
want these witnesses to give testimony on ultimate facts
which the jury must determine." '"The elements, yes,
the.IJ can certainly state all the elements that they deem
from observation caused this to be an extra hazardous
crossiny or whatever they decide. Does that cover it?"
In the discussion upon the Motion in Limine prior
tu calling of the jury the morning of trial, counsel for
plaintiffs indicated that, among others, he would call
La Vern D. Green, Utah County Engineer, as a
witness. During the trial counsel for plaintiffs did call
the witness La Vern D. Green (R. 175), but not only has
counsel for appellants failed to furnish any transcript
of the testimony given by Mr. Green when called on
.T uly 27, 1970, but what such transcript would show
would be the fact that in spite of the last word given by
the court in his ruling as above referred to, counsel for
plaintiffs asked such County Engineer not one single
question as to any condition or circumstance surrounding the crossing which might have in any way thrown
9

light upon any question of hazards existing at the crossing.
In absence of any evidence to shuw a hazardous condition at the crossing, with also complete absence of any
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant Railroad Company, and with overwhelming evidence as to
negligence on behalf of plaintiffs' decedent, the court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict (R.
179, Page 2).

STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION ORDER (PSCU DOCKET NO.
5317) AND THE APPLICATION ON WHICH
IT WAS BASED.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE QUESTION
OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OR THE
QUESTION OF DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENCE OR THE QUESTION OF DECEDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
10

ARGUlVlENT
At the outset respondent feels that there is nothing
before the court upon which the court could make any
<letermination as to the issues posed by appellants and
for that reason the appeal should be dismissed.

POINT 1
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO ALLO'V INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE O.F THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE
ORDER (PSCU DOCKET NO.
5317) AND THE APPLICATION ON WHICH
IT WAS BASED.
Appellants argue that the order of the Public
Service Commission should have been admitted in evidence to show some hazard at the crossing in question or
to show that the crossing was not a "safe crossing." It is
not understandable to respondent how appellants expect
this Honorable Court to pass upon the admissibility of
any documents which were purportedly offered in evidence without having the documents before this court
for the court to read in order that the court may know
the content of the documents themselves or what they
could show were they available to the court for proper
study.
Disregarding what respondent feels to be a fatal
defect in appellants' procedure, respondent nevertheless
strongly urges that upon a full consideration of the mat-
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ters contained in said documents they could not be considered admissible upon any basis.
Appellants state that it was vital to plaintiffs' case
that it be shown that the crossing was not a "safe crossing," or that it be shown to be a "hazardous crossing."
Respondent agrees with such. statement, and in spite of
the fact that no record of evidence introduced at the
trial has been placed before this Honorable Court for
consideration, respondent emphatically represents to the
court that there was not a scintilla of evidence introduced
upon the trial which would in any way tend to show that
the crossing was unsafe or that it was an extra hazardous
crossmg or that it was even an ordinarily hazardous
crossmg.
Plaintiffs at the trial sought and appellants here
seek to prove that the crossing was an extra hazardous
crossing purely by virtue of an ex parte order issued by
the Public Service Commission of Utah authorizing or
directing Utah County to change a flasher light from
one roadway which had been dead ended by freeway
construction to another roadway still in use where it
could serve a better public purpose.
The order in question was issued without any notice
or hearing, no evidence was taken, no witnesses
heard. An investigator from the State Public Service
Commission and an engineer from the Union Pacific
Railroad Company went down and looked the situation
over. Both of such parties are now deceased. There is no
evidence whatsoever of any written report of any kind
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having been made to the Public Service Commission.
There was no allegation in the original application and
no finding by the PSCU that the crossing was an extra
hazardous crossing in any way. There was no finding as
to any condition surrounding the crossing which might
in any way tend to show it to be hazardous. There was
no suggestion of obstructions to view, no indication of
any traffic count, no dust or atmospheric conditions that
might have affected a view at the crossing, no noise, no
curvatures nor inclining or declining approach to the
crossing. There was no evidence of any other accidents
at said crossing. There was not one item in the findings,
nor anywhere else suggested, that would indicate that
the Public Service Commission even considered the
question of any hazards existing at the crossing. The
only thing presented by the application and referred to
in the PSCU order was that there had theretofore existed a flasher light at 1350 North Street which had now
been dead ended against the freeway and that it would
be in the public interest to move that flasher light to a
street still in use by the public, and upon that basis the
Commission found it would be in the public interest to
move the flashing light and gave permission to Utah
County to move the flashing signal at Utah County's
c,rpense. There was a provision included in the order
that Utah County should notify and make arrangements
with Union Pacific Railroad Company for working out
the mechanics of the actual work to be performed so that
the County ,vould not be doing construction work around
and affecting the railroad track and railroad operations
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without the Railroad Company knowing what was being
done and for what reasons and by what authority. This
could not by any stretch of the imagination be an order
of the Public Service Commission directed to the Railroad Company "to install the crossing control semaphore
signals required by the order," and the very statement
of the order itself completely refutes appellants' Point
No. I where error is charged to the Court and negligence charged against the Railroad Company for its
failure to install the signals required by the order.
OPINIONS FROM. COUNTY OR STATE OFFICIALS, LETTERS
SUCH OFFICIALS OR REPORTS OF PUBLIC SERVICE
ETC., OR OPINIONS OF SUPPOSED EXPERTS GENERALLY ARE NOT
COMPETENT AND ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE OF A HAZARDOUS CROSSING NOR AS A BASIS FOR A CHARGE OF
NEGLIGENCE.
The courts which have passed upon the subject have
uniformly held that opinions and conclusions of officials
and supposed experts while they may in some respect be
relevant are not competent as evidence to prove existence of hazardous conditions at a crossing.

Bailey v. B. 0. R. Co., 227 F.2d 344
"Error is next assigned for the court's refusal
to admit a letter from the Village Board of LeRoy to defendant asserting that the crossing was
dai;gerous and requesting installation of safety
14

devices. If offered to prove the fact of the dangerous condition of the crossing, the letter was
obviously mere opinion, and therefore incompetent. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the letter
may be admitted to show that the railroad had
notice of the alleged danger. But even if the
crossing were dangerous and the railroad knew
it, these facts would not suffice to furnish a basis for a finding of negligence."

Phillips v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 259 A.2d
719 (N.J. Dec. 1969)
"There must be a reversal because of the erroneous admission in evidence, over defendant's
objection, of the report of a hearing examiner of
the Board of Public Utilitv Commissioners dated
March 21, 1967, together
a confirmatory decision and order of the Board, based on evidence
receiYed at hearings duly conducted by the officer, wherein it was found that 'visibility (was)
obstructed' at the crossing, that two accidents
had occurred at the location, and that there should
be installed at the crossing automatic
lights and bells with appropriate warning signs.'
The appellate court further stated:
"As to the prejudicial effect of the admission
of the documents there can be no doubt. The conclusions of the PUC concerned the very issue
here being tried-i.e., the extra-hazardous nature of the crossing."
"'Ve may add that we do not regard the stated
to the
documents as
objection of
irrelevant to the issues as mer1tor1ous. They were
quite relevant, and in this lies
prejudicial
effect, since they were incompetent.

Hughes v. Wabaah R. Co., 95 N.E.2d 735
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The witness in this case was the Assistant Chief
Engineer for the Illinois Commerce Commission. He
was allowed to testify that in his opinion the crossing was
extra hazardous, as a result the Illinois Appellate Court
reversed, saying:
"Defendant was not liable to protect the crossing with safety devices unless it was extra hazardous. 'Vith the witness expressing the opinion
that,, he did, he usurped the function of the jury.
"The trial court erred in allowing the witness
Thomas to express his opinion that the crossing
was an extra hazardous crossing, and in our opinion this constitutes reversible error."

Russell v. Miss. Central R. Co., 125 So.2d 283
In this case the trial court ref used to let a civil engineer give his opinion that the crossing was extra hazardous. In sustaining the trial court, the appellate court
stated:
"The question as to the opinion of a witness
was sustained inferring that this was invading
the province of the jury. The error assigned ref using the civil engineer and surveyor to testify
as expert witnesses regarding whether or not the
crossing involved was a dangerous crossing, and
extrahazardous to the traveling public, especially
at night,
clearly invading the province of the
jury in seeking an opinion."
In St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 416
S.,V.2d 273 (Ark.1967), a safety director for an Oklahoma company had certain hypothetical conditions
stated to him and was then asked his opinion as an ex-
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pert as to whether they would make a crossing extra
hazardous. The trial court admitted the testimony and,
in reversing, the appellate court stated:
"Not a single one of the foregoing facts taken
individually is beyond the comprehension of the
average juror; nor can we find any reason to say
that an average juror would not be competent to
determine from the facts when considered together whether the crossing was abnormally dangerous. 'Ve have consistently held that it is prejudicial error to admit expert testimony on issues
which could conveniently be demonstrated to the
jury from which they could draw their own conclusions. See S & S Construction Co. v. Stacks,
241 Ark. 1096, 411 S.,i\T.2d 508 (1967). Therefore we hold that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the expert testimony
on the abnormally dangerous crossing."
See also Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Bishop,
89 So.2d 738, H argadon v. Louisville and Nashville R.
Co., 375 S.,V.2d 834, and Central Mfg.
St. LomsSan Francisco Ry. Co., 394
704.

PLAINTIFFS' CASES
On pages 6 to 15 of appellants' brief a number of
cases are referred to and quoted from but not one single
case referred to on said pages is in point upon the question of admissibility of an opinion or order from a public official or public body to prove an unsafe crossing.
In the case of Van v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
366 P.2d 837 (Idaho), P. 6) there was substantial
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evidence introduced to go to the jury as to the nature of
the crossing. The case is very similar to the case of
Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R .Co., 79 Utah 439, 11
P .2d 305. In the Van case there were five tracks to cross
with railroad cars on the near tracks blocking the view.
A train came around a bend in the track after it had
moved in a switching movement in one direction and
then reversed. The court concluded that a jury question
was presented because reasonable men could differ on
the facts and circumstances in evidence. In this Bridges
case the plaintiffs did not introduce any of such "facts
and circumstances" and the Public Service Commission
order in question referred to no "facts and circumstances" existing at the crossing.
In the case of Fleenor v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
102 P. 897, (P. 6), a pedestrian was killed at a populous
street crossing. There was evidence as to lack of whistles
or bells, no headlight and a train operated at excess speed
through a highly populated area. No such evidence appears in the Bridges case.
In Finn v. Spokane P.
S. Ry. Company, 214
P.2d 354 (Ore.) (P. 7), no question of official order
was involved. The evidence showed the roadway to be
an arterial highway over which heavy traffic moved. "It
was a cold dark and foggy morning and plaintiff had
visibility of only 30 to 40 feet."
On page 8 counsel quotes from the Finn case and
refers to other Oregon cases.
In the case of Fish v. Southern Pacific, 143 P.2d
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917, 145 P.2d 991, (P. 8), there was evidence that plain-

tiff's vision of the main line track was obstructed by boxcars on a switch track parallel thereto.

In the case of Doty v. Southern Pacific Company,
207 P.2d 131, (page 8) the plaintiff's vision was also
likewise obstructed by boxcars.
There was other evidence considered in both of
these cases relevant to the danger of the railroad crossing but the obstruction of vision by the boxcars was the
principal factor. In the Fish case the track approached
on a curve. The street approached the crossing on a rising grade and vision was obstructed by buildings, trees
and shrubbery, including a railroad tool house. Under
these circumstances and not because of any Commission
order or other official order, the court said that the question of "whether the crossing in question was extra hazardous or dangerous must be determined after consideration of all the facts and circumstances." In the
Bridges case at bar there were no "facts and circumstances" presented at the trial from which a jury could
rnake any consideration or draw any conclusion.
In the case of Dimick v. Northern Pacific Railway,

3.J.8 P.2d 786, (page 11), the roadway approached on an

incline with lights ahead which were confusing to a highway traveler, particularly one not acquainted with the
area. Young Bridges who was killed in the accident in
the case at bar was not a stranger unacquainted with the
area. He had lived near this crossing for his entire life
( R. 27) and his most recent point of employment was
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on the same roadway approximately 1000 feet easterly
from the crossing in question ( R. 29-30) .
In the case of Coffman v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., 378 S.\V.2d 583 (page 11) there was an incline
in the highway with curves approaching the crossing and
obstructions to view by buildings and trees in the area.
The case of St. Louis-San Francisco R. Company
v. Prince, 291 P. 973, 71 ALll 369, is referred to on
page 10 of appellants' brief. The quotation there given
is not from the case itself but from the annotator's head
notes, and in connection therewith we would admit that
if there was evidence of "peculiar construction and situation" or the amount of traffic passing thereover, or
any other evidence from which a jury could draw any
conclusion as to the dangerous condition of the crossing,
then submission to a jury might be proper. No such evidence was introduced in this Bridges case.
It is interesting to note that the annotation in 71
ALR 369 is the second annotation upon the subject.
The first one appears in 16 ALR 1273. In both of these
volumes the first case cited at the beginning of the annotation is the case of Grand
Railway Co. v. Ives,
144 U.S. 408, 36 L.Ed. 485, 12 S.Ct. 679. That case as
decided by the United States Supreme Court has been
a landmark case for many years and is repeatedly cited
in these railroad accident cases even today. In that case
the United States Supreme Court stated:
" ... It seems, howeYer, that before a jury will
be warranted in saying, in the absence of any
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statutory direction to that effect, that a railroad
company should keep a flagman or gates at a
it must f
shown that such crossing
is more than ordmarily hazardous: as, for instance, that it is in a thickly populated portion of
a town or city; or, that the view of the track is
obstructed either by the company itself or by
other objects proper in themselves; or, that the
crossing is a much travelled one and the noise of
approaching trains is rendered indistinct and the
ordinary signals difficult to be heard by reason
of bustle and confusion incident to railway or
other business; or, by reason of some such like
cause: and that a ,jury would not be warranted in
saying that a railroad company should maintain
those extra precautions at ordinary crossings in
t h e country ...."
There was no evidence whatsoever introduced upon
the trial of the case at bar as to hazardous conditions
existing at the crossing. The photographs and the map,
Exhibit 1, show that the crossing is located in a wide
open country district, not in a heavily populated area.
The only evidence with respect to traffic upon the roadway was introduced by defendant not by plaintiff (Exhibits 52-54). There was no evidence of any obstructions, noise, adverse climatic conditions, curvatures or
incline in the roadway. The exhibits show contrary.
There was no evidence as to any other accident. The
only evidence is to the contrary ( R. 15). The pictures
which were introduced on behalf of plaintiffs were taken
by one Bryant Hanson, who was produced as a witness
for plaintiffs ( R. 179) . Hanson's sole occupation is a
private accident investigator. Yet, except for identify-
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ing the pictures, he said not one word about any hazardous conditions existing at the crossing.
On page 14 appellants state, "That the order of the
Public Service Commission was based upon sufficient
evidence at a regularly held meeting was not disputed,
and the document, therefore, speaks for itself." RESPONDENT DOES NOT AGREE \VITH THIS
Such evidence as there is in the record does dispute the statement so made. There was
no "regularly held meeting" or hearing held by the
Collllllission, and as to "sufficient evidence," there is
not one item of evidence shown anywhere in the record nor would any appear from the application and
PSCU order were they before the court. 'Ve would
agree partly with appellants that "the document
. . . speaks for itself" if appellants had only seen fit to
bring to and present the documents before this court
for consideration so that they could speak for themselves.
On page 10 of their brief appellants quote a statement that "actual or constructive knowledge of the circircumstances" is "an essential element" to impose liability upon the Railroad Company. If plaintiffs in mak·
ing proof on their case had produced any evidence suffi·
cient for a jury's consideration with respect to any hazardous conditions existing at the crossing, then the question as to the railroad's knowledge, actual or constructive, might be of some materiality, but that does not assist
appellants in this case because no evidence of circum-
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existing at the crossing was introduced in evidence before the jury; and in spite thereof, at the pretrial it was stipulated that the defendant knew of and
had received a copy of the Public Service Commission
report and order "and had full knowledge of its contents shortly after its issue." ( R. 45 P. 2 Para. 5a).
There is nothing in such order, permitting Utah County
to remove a flasher signal from a street dead ended by
freeway construction to an open street, that would give
the Railroad Company any knowledge either actual or
constructive as to any hazards that may exist at the
crossing.
Even had the flashing light actually been moved
and relocated, this still would not have put the Railroad
Company on notice of any claimed hazards at the crossmg.

A case which has been cited almost as much as the
case of Grand Trunk Railway Co. vs. Ives is the case of
Bledsoe v. Missouri, K. T. R. Co., 90 P.2d 9 (Kans.).
In that case the trial court allowed the question to go to
the jury and the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed,
saying:

,.

:-

;t
·

"Plaintiffs further contend that whether a
railroad crossing is unusually dangerous is a question of fact for the jury ... This is true only when
there is substantial competent evidence that the
crossing is unusually danger?m·. Unless such evidence is produced the quest10n is one of law for
the court. The authorities on this point do not go
so far as to authorize allegations to be made respecting any railroad crossing to the effect that
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it is unusually dangerous, and because of such
to say that the question is one for the

JUry.

The question of automatic signals became an issue
on the appeal in that case because after the accident, by
the time of trial, the State Highway Department had installed automatic electric signals and mention was made
of this at the trial; however, the Kansas Supreme Court
said:
"B:y the time of the trial an electrical wig-wag
and lights had been installed at this crossing.
Plaintiffs made much of that in the trial court
and here. The evidence in the record makes it
clear that these devices were not installed at the
expense of the railroad company by reason of an
order of the state highway commission made in
pursuance of G.S. 135, 68-414 .... "
"On the other hand, the devices were installed
by the state highway commission under a written
agreement with defendant here that its men
would install the devices and the state highway
commission pay the cost thereof, which was done.
In other words, this was done b,lJ the state as a
highway improvement pro;ect, at its own expense.
Qb,·iously, the state highway commission did not
regard the crossing as being so unusually dangerous that it would be justified in
an
order requiring defendant to install addit10na,!
safety devices or warning signals at its expense.
'Ve earnestlv insist with respect to the case at bar
that it is obvious that the Public Service Commission of
Utah did not think that the crossing in question was
extra hazardous or dangerous enough to require the
Railroad Company to install the flasher lights in ques0
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tion, but upon request of the County merely granted
permission to the County to make improvements at this
and other crossings and to move the existing signals at
the C aunty's expense and only added that the Railroad
Company should be notified in order to properly coordinate operations with both highway and railroad
traffic.
A finding "that the proposal of the applicant is in
the public interest" could not possibly be considered as
improper in any view of the circumstances; but this cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as
any sort of a finding by the Public Service Commission
that the
in question or either of the two crossings were in any way hazardous or extra hazardous. It
was merely an ex parte approval by the PSCU of a request by the County to move at its expense a flasher signal from a street which had been "dead ended" by freeway construction, and where clearly it would serve no
further public purpose, to a nearby highway crossing
still in use where it could serve a useful purpose and
thus be in the interest of the public to do so.
The case of Baltimore and Ohio Rai,lroad v. Felgenhauer, 168 F.2d 12, cited at page 15 of appellants'
brief is typical of the "several cases" which have been
eited "in support of appellants' position" and is the only
case which makes any reference to any order of a public
service commission or other public body. That case, howeYer, is entirely contra to plaintiffs' position in this case
and holds that such order is not admissible to show any
25

hazardous condition or any negligence or "violation uf
duty" on the part of the Railroad Company. In that case,
about two months prior to the accident, the Illinois Commerce Commission had made a traffic suney and found
that during a ten hour period
vehides moved over
the crossing, which was a busy crossing in a "built up
part of the city." The Commission did issue an order and
the order was admitted into evidence but the finding a.1
to the "extra hazardous natun; of the crossing" was not
based thereon. At page 14 of 108
the court stated
that a decision "requires a brief statement of the facts
developed upon the trial," and the court then proceeds
for approximately two pages to "briefly" state such
facts which had been testified to by witnesses, finally
concluding that the evidence \\'as suffieicnt for the jury's
consideration and decision. The facts introduced by testimony, in addition to showing the traffic count over a
busy city street, showed that there were three railroad
tracks in the vicinity with substantial switching back and
forth in the area. ' Vithin 150 feet of the crossing the
"railway curves to the south" and there were buildings
and strudures, including standing railroad rolling equip·
ment, which "restricted the view." In addition to switching movements "noises in the neighborhood rendered it
difficult to hear signals." 'Vithin a short period of time
prior to the accident in question there had been twelre
reportable accidents at the crossing, and within a period
of nine vears prior thereto there had been eleven fatal
accidents at the crossing. These facts and conditions sur·
rounding the crossing and the testimony with respect
1
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thereto as stated above took nearly two pages for the
court to "briefly" state.
',Yith respect to the order which had been issued by
the Illinois Commission, the trial court gave an instruction which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved, stating: "This order does not show any violation of duty by the defendant, the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company, and it was not received in evidence
for that purpose." Other overwhelming evidence as to
the conditions of the crossing was introduced and the
order was "received in evidence for the limited purpose
only of showing that the extra hazardous condition of
those crossings was brought to the attention of the defendant at that time by the Illinois Commerce Commis. ,,
ston.
In the case at bar had there been evidence of any
hazardous conditions at the crossing, it would not have
been necessary to introduce the PSCU order to show
notice to the defendant herein. Knowledge on the part
of the respondent of the PSCU order in question was
not only early admitted to but stipulated to (R. 45, Page
2, 5 a).
The Felgenhauer case, as well as most of the other
cases cited by appellants, referred to and many of them
quoted from the case of Grand Trunk Railroad Co. v.
Ives, supra.
A more recent decision of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals is the case of Gant v.
Northwestrrn lllf. Co., 434 F.2d 1255 (Iowa 1970), wherein the
rnurt in ref erring to various bases or principles which
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must be considered in such cases, stated: "Our duty is
not to decide whether the crossing in question was in
fact extra-ordinarily ha'.lardous so that some warning
beyond the statutory requirements was ca1led for, but
only to say whether there was substantial evidence from
which a jury might so find .... ' The court referred to
and quoted the matter hereinaLove quoted from the case
of Grand Trunk Railroad Co. v. Ives, and after referring to other cases cited by plaintiffs in that case concluded: "In each of the cases relied upon by plaintiff
some physical factor or some type of evidence was present which is conspicuously absent in the instant case." In
the Bridges case at bar there is a conspicuous absence of
evidence which would in any way tend to show physical
factors surrounding the crossing. In fact, as shown by
the picture exhibits and maps in evidence, the statement
of the Eighth Circuit Court in the Gant case is very applicable: "Indeed, it is established that all four quadrants of the intersection just west of the crossing are
open fields, and there are no obstructions or buildings
within 500 feet of the crossing."
In the offer of plaintiffs' counsel he stated (R. 192,
Page 2) that l\fr. I-Ianks would testify "they had numerous hearings" where "citizenry came into their
chambers to complain" about conditions at the crossing.
If there had been numerous citizens who had so com·
plained, it is inconceivable that plaintiffs could not have
produced just one or two as witnesses who could have
testified before thl'. jury at the trial as to actual conditions at the crossing of which they had theretofore com·
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plained to the County Commission. Testimony from Mr.
Hanks as to the content of any actual complaints would
be hearsay and testimony that there had been complaints
would not be competent or probative evidence as to any
existing hazardous condition if such there might have
been.
The order of the Public Service Commission either
with or without any accompanying supporting documents as tendered by plaintiffs was deary inadmissible
and incompetent as evidence to prove any issue in the
case, and the court did not err in granting the .Motion
in Limine and in refusing to admit the proffered evidence.
POINT II

THE COUH.'l' DID NOT EHH IN llEFUSING TO SUDI\IIT TO THE .JURY THE
QUESTION OF
ARATIYE NEGLIGENCE OR THE. QUES'J'ION'OF DEFENDAN'J''S NEGLIGENCE Oll 'lTIE
OF DECEDENT'S CONTRillUTOHY NEGLIGENCE.
In restating their Point II for purposes of argument on Page 18, appellants neglected to include in
such restatement the question of submitting this case to
a jury on the basis of comparative negligence and restate their Point II as including anly defendant's negligence or decedent's contributory negligence. However,
except for a few lines on the bottom of Page 18 and top
of Page 19, the entire remainder of the brief includes
argument on the question of comparative negligence.
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'Vith respect to the question of defendant's negligence or decedent's contributory negligence, respondent
will only state that there is nothing before the court
which can be considered by the court at this time on the
question of defendant's negligence or the question of decedent's contributory negligence. \Vithout a transcript
of the testimony or evidence introduced before the jury
sufficient to show some basis for a finding of negligence,
either way, there is absolutely no basis upon which this
court could decide whether or in what way defendant
was negligent or whether or in what way the decedent
was contributorily negligent, and in the face of such
record there is no possible basis upon which this Honorable Court could question or overturn the ruling of the
trial court with respect to such matters.
Even upon the theory of comparative negligence,
where there is no evidence and no transcript showing
what might have been before the jury, there is no way
that this court could conclude -whether or not there was
any evidence on the part of either the deceased or the
defendant which could in any way be compared even
should there be an attempt to apply the doctrine of corn·
parative negligence.

COl\IP ARA'l'lYE NEGLIGENCE
In the last four plus pages of their brief appellants
have argued an<l cited a numer of law review articles
and theoretical discussions with respect to the compara·
will not attempt
tivc negligence doctrine.
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to answer or argue any of such theories, treatises or discussions of such doctrine and will only state that regardless of what may or may not be some sort of a trend as
indicated by various theses of these liberal law school
professors and others, respondent prefers to follow what
has been accepted and followed as general American
doctrine by the majority of the courts in the United
States.
At the beginning of statehood, the State of Utah in
the Revised Statutes of 1898 stated in Section 2488,
Page 559:
"The common law of England, so far as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, or the constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of
decision in all the courts of this state."
This adoption of the "common law" is in effect a
statutory enactment which by statute makes such common law the law of the State of Utah to be followed by
its courts. Although it is stated in the statute as "the
common law of England," the courts have interpreted
and considered this to be an adoption of that "common
law" as it has been developed and recognized and followed in the various states of the United States rather
than the old common law as it had been developed in
England prior to the date of this statutory enactment.
However, considering such to be the case, such common
law as it has been adopted and followed in the United
States has continued in the large majority of all of the
states of the Union to recognize that the above quoted
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statute has the effect to make that general cornmon law
the enforceable law until and unless it has been changed
by the legislative representatives of the various states
which might be involved. There have been a few of the
states in the United States that have changed this doc.
trine-less than
percent-and in none of them has
such a change in this law with respect to comparative
negligence been adopted except by act of the people's
chosen representatives in the state legislatures-in spite
of any theories that have been advanced over the years
by the various liberal law professors and writers on the
subject.
In the recent case of Bates v. Donnaficld, 481 P.2d
347 (Feb. 1971), the Supreme Court of the State of
',y yarning had a similar question before it. It did not in·
volve a question of railroad or intersectional aecidents
but it did involve urging on the part of the plaintiffs to
have the courts change a provision of the common law.
It was argued in that case that "the common law rule
long prevailing in the United States is for various reasons unwarranted and that this court should follow what
plaintiffs contend to be a definite trend to overrule it."
In affirming a trial court's decision against plaintiffs on
such theory, the YVyoming Supreme Court stated:
"We do not ... agree that an ancient doctrine
firmly imhedded in that great body of Anglo·
Saxon law which we inclusively refer to as the
'Common law' and which became that law
through early 'usaae and custom, can be judici·
allv
an-F more than courts are auth?r·
ize.cl to
statutory law because in their op1n·
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ion the reason for the legislative enactment no
longer justified the continuance of the law."
"\Ve think it far more salutory and in the overall more equitable that the common law which we
hav:e
in this
be changed by
legislative enactment, which would admit of some
certainty as to the state of the law rather than
speculation as to what trends might be adopted."
Upon urging similar to that of appellants in the
case at bar, the State of Idaho in Whiffin v. Union Pac.
R. Co., 89 P.2d 540, at 551, stated:
"Until the law-making power repeals the rule
of contributory negligence, it is for the courts to
enforce it as it stands. They are not at liberty to
amend it in the interest of auto drivers, even
though the latter now form a very numerous portion of the community. The rule is based upon the
idea that under all situations of danger, it is for
every rational person to exercise due care for his
own safety. 'Vhether such care has been exercised is a question of fact, ordinarily for solution
by a jury. But occasionally it is so clear that a
plaintiff has omitted an obvious precaution for
his own safety, required by any measure of due
care however lax, that it becomes the duty of the
court to deny him recovery. This is such a case."
The doctrine of comparative negligence has been
expressly rejected by this Utah Supreme Court in a
case that was decided in 1911. Although it is an old case,
it has never been overruled on that particular point. See
Myers v. San Pedro, L.A. S.L.R. Co., 39 Utah 198,
ll6 P. nm. In that case this court said:@ 39 Utah 203
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'.' ... The <loctrine does not and never did pre.
vail in this jurisdiction."
Volume ti5 A, C.J.S., at Page 258, states that the
doctrine of comparative negligence "is not recognized
in any state, except where statutes establish the doctrine.'
The State of Nevada has refused to adopt the doctrine in absence of legislative action. See CoJ: v. Los
Angeles and S.L.ll. Co., 58 P.2d 373.
The case of 1llaki v. Frclk, 229 N.E.2d 284 (Ill.),
is the only case from any court cited by appellants, anJ
this is a case upon which appellants relied in the trial
court. Counsel on page 20 admits that this lower court
decision has now been overruled and reversed by the
Illinois Supreme Court. The trial court in that case
refused to adopt or follow the theory of comparative
negligence. The matter went first from the trial court to
the Illinois Appellate Court of the Second District,
which court reviewed the history of contributory negli·
gence, pointing out the fact that it had its origin in Eng·
land in 1809, but that in spite of that English doctrine.
Illinois had adopted the doctrine of comparative negli·
gence as early as 1858. After 1858 the compartive negli·
gence doctrine was followed in Illinois for many yean
until towards the end of the century. Even the State of
Illinois, however, veered away from the doctrine during
that period. That intermediate appellate court referred
to the fact that at the time of such hearing "in seven
states a form of comparative negligence has been adopt·
ed." The court neglected to state that in all of those
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seven states the doctrine of comparative negligence had
been adopted by the legislature and not by the courts.
Ne\'ertheless, that intermediate appellate court adopted
and applied such comparative negligence theory. The
matter then went directly by appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Illinois, 239 N.E.2d 445, which
court reversed the appellate court (July 1968) and held
the matter to be one for the legislature to decide, saying:
"After full consideration we think, however,
that such a far-reaching change, if desirable,
should be made by the legislature rather than by
the court. The General Assembly is the department of government to which the constitution has
entrusted the power of changing the laws."
" ... when a rule of law has once been settled,
contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can
be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely
to arise prejudicial to public interests ... The
rule of stare decisis is founded upon sound principles in the administration of justice, and rules
long recognized as the law should not be departed
from merely
the court is of the opinion
that it might decide otherwise were the question
a new one."
"Counsel on both sides have argued this case
at length, supplying the court with a
sive review of many authorities. But we
that on the whole the considerations advanced in
support of a change in the rule might better be
addressed to the legislature. As amici have pointed out the General Assembly has incorporated
the
doctrine of
1?-egligence
as an integral part of statutes dealmg with a num-
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her of particular subjects ... and the legislative
branch is manifestly in a better position than is
this court to consider the numerous problems involved."
"The judgment of the appellate court will
therefore be reversed, the order of the circuit
court affirmed .... "
'Ve think this court is aware of the fact that in the
1971 regular session of the Utah Legislature the theory
was presented to the Utah Legislature both by House
Bill 7 and Senate Bill 25, and after consideration by
both Houses of the Utah Legislature, each of the two
bills was defeated, with the provision however that the
matter be referred to the Utah Legislative Council for
interim study. In the face of such prospective action, it
is inconceivable that this court against all precedents
that have appeared to date in the various states of the
United States, would by court decree make any change
in the long established and followed principles of law
within the State of Utah, at least until after the legislative representatives have, pursuant to legislative direction, made a full study and report of the matter.

CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset of this brief, respondent
earnestly insists that there is nothing properly before
this court in the record as produced herein by appellants
3<1

which would justify the court in doing anything but dismissing the appeal for lack of proper record and proper
presentation of facts which could and of necessity would
have to be considered by this court.
Regardless of the record or any lack of proper matters in the record presented to the court, even upon a
full consideration thereof upon any basis of merit, there
is no escape from the conclusion that the order of the
Public Service Commission of Utah and any documents
accompanying it or tendered in connection therewith
were incompetent and not sufficient as probative evidence to in any way suffice for submission to and for a
jury to make any determination upon the issue as to
whether or not any hazards or extra hazardous conditions existed at the crossing in question at the time of
the accident.
Upon the same basis and for the same reason-an
entire lack of record, testimony or evidence showing or
even tending to show any basis for either negligence on
the part of the defendant or contributory negligence on
the part of plaintiffs-this court can do nothing except
to affirm the action of the trial court. Upon the basis of
any argument with respect to comparative negligence,
both law and precedent, as well as reason, would compel
the conclusion that this is a matter that must be addressed to the discretion of and action by the legislature
of the State of Utah rather than action by this court as
requested.
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The judgment of the lower court should be af.
firmed in full.
Respectfully submitted,
A. U. Miner
S. A. Goodsell
J. C. Williams
Attorneys for Respondent
Union Pacific Railroad Company
600 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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